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Abstract
Objectives—In this proof-of-concept trial, we examined the feasibility and preliminary efficacy 
of Understanding Social Situations (USS), a new social cognitive intervention that targets higher-
level social cognitive skills using methods common to neurocognitive remediation, including drill 
and practice and hierarchically structured training, which may compensate for the negative effects 
of cognitive impairment on learning.
Methods—Thirty-eight individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders completed the same 
baseline assessment of cognitive and social cognitive functioning twice over a one month period to 
minimize later practice effects, then received 7–10 sessions of USS training, and then completed 
the same assessment again at post-treatment
Results—USS training was well tolerated and received high treatment satisfaction ratings. Large 
improvements on the USS Skills Test, which contained items similar to but not identical to 
training stimuli, suggest that we were effective in teaching specific training content. Content gains 
generalized to improvements on some of the social cognitive tasks, including select measures of 
attributional bias and theory of mind. Importantly, baseline neurocognition did not impact the 
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amount of learning during USS (as indexed by USS Skills test), nor the amount of improvement 
on social cognitive measures.
Conclusions and Implications for Practice—USS shows promise as a treatment for higher-
level social cognitive skills. Given the lack of relationship between baseline cognition and 
treatment effects, it may be particularly appropriate for individuals with lower-range cognitive 
function.
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cognition; social cognition; schizophrenia; treatment; cognitive remediation
Social cognition has been defined as “the domain of cognition that involves the perception, 
interpretation, and processing of social information” (Penn, Corrigan, Bentall, Racenstein, & 
Newman, 1997). Although related to basic neurocognition, social cognition is a separable 
construct, and has been shown to mediate the relationship between neurocognition and 
functioning (Schmidt, Mueller & Roder, 2011). Broadly, social cognition can be divided into 
the following domains: 1) affect recognition, the processing and identification of emotional 
information; 2) social perception/social knowledge, or the ability to identify 
interrelationships and social cues in social situations as well as gauge social rules and 
expectations; 3) Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other people’s intentions, beliefs, 
and mental states, and 4) Attributional Style (AS), or the types of attributions individuals 
make about the causes of events, with individuals who have psychosis being more likely to 
blame others for negative events. Although attributional style and theory of mind are 
separable domains (Mancuso, Horan, Kern & Green, 2011), it has been suggested that these 
two domains may be closely related, with deficits in the ability to correctly infer other 
people’s intentions and mental states related to the types of attributions individuals make 
about the causes of events (Penn, Sanna, & Roberts, 2008; Randall, Corcoran, Day, & 
Bentall, 2003; Taylor & Kinderman, 2002).
There is ample evidence of medium to large effect size impairments in social cognition in 
individuals with psychosis (Savla, Vella, Armstrong, Penn, & Twamley, 2013), and these 
impairments have in turn been linked to poor social functioning (Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 
2006; Fett et al., 2011; Schmidt, Mueller, & Roder, 2011). Hence, it is no surprise that social 
cognition has been identified as a potential target for interventions aimed at improving 
functional outcomes in individuals with psychosis. To date, dozens of different social 
cognitive interventions have been developed, ranging from very brief, narrowly focused 
experimental manipulations to quite long, intensive treatments that include training on 
multiple facets of social cognition, in some cases in the context of other rehabilitation 
(Fiszdon, 2013).
Several literature reviews have examined the efficacy of social cognitive interventions 
(Fiszdon & Reddy, 2012; Kurtz & Richardson, 2012). From these, it appears that the most 
frequently and successfully targeted social cognitive domain has been affect recognition, 
with moderate to large effect size improvements. There have been far fewer evaluations of 
interventions targeting more complex, higher-level social cognitive processes such as theory 
of mind and attributional style, and the results of these trials have been more mixed, with 
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small to moderate effects on theory of mind, and no discernible impact on attributional style 
(Kurtz & Richardson, 2012).
We have previously suggested that the more modest success of interventions focused on 
higher-level social cognitive processes may be due to the higher task demands of such 
interventions (Fiszdon & Reddy, 2012; Roberts & Velligan, 2012). Specifically, while 
interventions targeting lower-level social cognitive domains often rely on highly structured, 
repetitive behavioral approaches focused on learning simple associations between 
observations and deductions (e.g. wide open eyes are most often associated with surprise or 
fear), many of the higher-level interventions involve more complex, cognitively taxing 
processes, such as psychoeducation, open-ended questions, analysis of more complex and 
ambiguous stimuli, recall of large chunks of information, and group evaluation and 
discussion of multiple social scenarios. This latter approach may be less successful given 
that among individuals with social cognitive impairments, neurocognitive impairments may 
be particularly common (Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Fanning, Bell, & Fiszdon, 2012; 
Freeman et al., 2014; Garety et al., 2013; Ochoa et al., 2014), along with emerging evidence 
suggesting that baseline neurocognition may moderate the efficacy of most (Garety et al., 
2015), though not all (Bechi et al., 2013) social cognitive interventions.
With the above in mind, we developed a new social cognitive intervention that narrowly 
targets components of higher-level social cognitive domains (theory of mind and 
attributional style), but that may limit cognitive load, and uses strategies that are commonly 
used in neurocognitive remediation, including hierarchically structured training, 
performance-based increases in task difficulty, and massed drill and practice, to name a few. 
In the current report, we provide data on the initial feasibility, tolerability and efficacy of this 
proof-of-concept intervention.
Methods
Participants
Individuals were recruited by word of mouth, team presentations, and flyers placed at 
hospitals and community mental health centers. In order to be eligible for participation, the 
following criteria had to be met: diagnosis of schizophrenia-spectrum disorder; presence of 
attribtuional style or theory of mind deficit as indicated by performance ≥ 0.5 standard 
deviations below norms, aged 18 or older; no evidence of developmental disability in chart 
or on baseline assessment; psychiatrically stable as evidenced by minimum of 90 days since 
discharge from last hospitalization and 60 days since last change in psychiatric medications; 
no current (30 days) diagnosis of substance use disorder; English as primary language; no 
severe, uncorrected auditory/visual impairment or known neurological disorder judged likely 
to affect response to intervention. Local Institutional Review Board, and written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants or legally authorized representatives, as 
appropriate.
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Procedure
This was a within-subject, double baseline design, with the two baselines (T1 and T2) 
administered 1 month apart. Since there was limited information about the psychometric 
properties of the social cognitive measures at the beginning of the study, the double-baseline 
design was used in order to control for any potential practice effects. The first baseline was 
preceded by a screening session, to determine whether participants met diagnostic criteria 
and exhibited impairments in theory of mind or attributional style. Impaired performance 
was quantified as performance ≥ .5 standard deviations below published healthy control 
norms on one of the primary attributional style measures or one of the primary theory of 
mind measures (see Measures section for details).
After the second baseline, participants were administered the social cognitive training 
sessions at a rate of two per week, over the course of about a month. At the end of each 
session, participants were asked to fill out treatment satisfaction ratings. Once finished with 
the training, participants were administered the final post-training assessment (T3). 
Participants were paid for their participation.
Measures
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (First, 1996), administered by the first author 
was used to confirm psychiatric diagnosis. The Wide Range Achievement Test-3, Reading 
(WRAT-3 Reading; Jastak & Wilkenson, 1993) was used to assess premorbid intelligence. 
Current cognitive function was assessed using the Matrics Consensus Cognitive Battery 
(MCCB; Nuechterlein et al., 2004). Psychiatric symptoms and overall functioning were 
assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 
1987), and the Quality of Life Scale (Heinrichs, Hanlon, & Carpenter, 1984). Motivation for 
the social cognitive training was assessed using the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory for 
Schizophrenia Research (IMI-SR; Choi, Mogami, & Medalia, 2009). Treatment satisfaction 
was assessed using a five-item Likert-format scale developed for the current study.
We (JMF and DLR) also developed a 22-item measure of intervention content (USS Skills 
Test), assessing knowledge of principles and skills taught during the social cognitive 
intervention. Format and focus of these items was based on (though was not the same as) 
content of the training modules. For example, trainees were presented with photographs and 
asked to determine whether statements about those photographs were facts (e.g the woman 
has dark hair) or guesses (e.g. the woman is happy). For other test items, trainees had to 
evaluate social photographs and determine whether specific statements about them were 
good or bad guesses, or look at a sequence of photographs and determine which of several 
choices would be the most appropriate to complete the sequence.
Primary social cognitive measures included two measures of attributional style and two 
measures of theory of mind. These measures were selected because of their frequency of use 
and/or their demonstrated sensitivity to social cognitive training effects.
The primary AS measures were the Internal Personal and Situational Attributions 
Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) and the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility 
Questionnaire (AIHQ; Combs, Penn, Wicher, & Waldheter, 2007). The IPSAQ consists of 
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16 positive and 16 negative social scenarios (e.g. a friend betrayed the trust you had in her), 
where the examinee is asked to imagine herself in the situation, hypothesize about why the 
situation may have occurred and indicate whether the cause of the situation had something to 
do with the participant herself (internal attribution), whether it was something about the 
other person (external personal attribution), or whether it was something about the situation 
(situational attribution). A personalizing bias (PB) score is computed, which reflects the 
likelihood that the examinee will attribute the cause of negative events to other people as 
opposed to situational factors, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency to do so. The 
AIHQ consists of 15 vignettes describing social scenarios with negative outcomes that vary 
in intentionality, with a third of the vignettes describing what are most likely purposeful 
actions (e.g. someone cancels a date with you), a third describing what are most likely 
incidental actions (e.g. someone in a dance club bumps into you), and a third describing 
situations that are ambiguous (e.g. you walk by a group of teens, who begin to laugh). Each 
vignette is followed by a series of questions assessing amount of hostility, blame and 
aggression that the examinee states she would experience if in the situation. For the current 
analyses, we focused on ambiguous vignettes.
The two primary theory of mind measures were the Hinting Task (Corcoran, Mercer, & 
Frith, 1995; Greig, Bryson, & Bell, 2004) and the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). The Hinting Task consists 
of 10 vignettes, where the examinee is presented with a dyad social interaction and asked to 
make inferences about the intent behind a hint dropped by one of the characters. Responses 
are rated 0–2 points, with higher scores reflecting better theory of mind (range 0–20). The 
Eyes Task consists of 36 black-and-white photographs of the eye regions of faces. For each 
photo, examinees are presented with four word choices, and asked to select the adjective 
they believe best describes what the person may be thinking or feeling. Higher scores 
indicate better theory of mind (range 0–36).
Several additional social cognitive measures were also included in order to obtain 
preliminary information about their reliability and sensitivity, and evaluate the potential 
generalizability of training effects. The exploratory social cognitive measures included: The 
Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald, Flanagan, & Rollins, 2002), a series 
of video vignettes where examinees are asked to distinguish sincerity from sarcasm and lies, 
the Picture Stories Task (Brune, 2005), a picture sequencing task with social content, the 
Comic Strip Task (Brunet, Sarfati, & Hardy-Bayle, 2003; Sarfati, Brunet, & Hardy-Bayle, 
2003; Sarfati, Passerieux, & Hardy-Bayle, 2000), where examinees are asked to select a 
picture that reflects the comic character’s future intentions, the Davos Assessment of 
Cognitive Biases Scale (DACOBS; van der Gaag et al., 2013), a comprehensive self-report 
measure assessing multiple social cognitive domains, and the Bell-Lysaker Emotion 
Recognition Task (BLERT; Bell, Bryson, & Lysaker, 1997), an affect recognition task. The 
standard administration of the BLERT was amended to also include a confidence judgment 
metacognitive measure (Koren, Seidman, Goldsmith, & Harvey, 2006; Moritz, Woznica, 
Andreou, & Kother, 2012) by asking the examinee, at the end of each emotion recognition 
trial, to indicate how confident she was that her answer was correct, using Likert-type 
anchors ranging from “100% sure” (4) to “guessed” (1). We then calculated average 
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confidence ratings for trials where the examinee correctly identified an emotion and 
confidence ratings for trials where the examinee was incorrect.
Understanding Social Situations (USS) training
Understanding Social Situations (USS) was designed as a proof-of-concept training, to 
evaluate whether techniques and principles common to neurocognitive remediation can be 
effectively used to train higher-level social cognitive skills in individuals with schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders with poor neurocognition. USS is individually-administered and trainer-
led, and consists of four modules targeting different aspects of theory of mind and 
attributional style. Each module contains multiple difficulty levels, with numerous exercise 
trials at each level. Module content was largely adapted from successful brief lab-based 
experimental interventions for theory of mind and attributional style, as cited below. USS is 
administered over the course of 7–10 sessions, each session about an hour long. Verbal 
vignettes, cartoon series, video clips and audio clips are presented on a computer throughout 
the training, and the trainee is guided through the stimuli, with trainer adjusting task 
difficulty and providing corrective feedback as appropriate. At the end of each session, a 
short homework assignment related to that day’s training content is given, and reviewed at 
the beginning of the next session.
The training relies on methods common to neurocognitive remediation, with participants 
learning complex skills by first practicing their individual components. Once participants 
demonstrate a mastery of “building block” skills and concepts, the training exercises move 
on to more refined, complex variations of the skills that build on what was mastered at an 
earlier level. Techniques used throughout include massed drill-and-practice, performance-
based increases in task difficulty, use of visual cues to reduce memory load (e.g. auditory 
and written presentation of vignettes), modeling, scaffolding (trainer provided instructional 
support), and verbal mediation (trainees asked to describe out loud the exercise stimuli 
and/or asked to ‘talk-through’ what information they used to reach various inferences). USS 
training progresses from more clear-cut, forced-choice or multiple-choice social scenarios to 
more nuanced, multi-dimensional scenarios where individuals are encouraged to assess all 
relevant aspects of a situation and generate their own responses. The difficulty of tasks is 
further manipulated throughout the training by varying social scenario ambiguity level, 
valence, and self-relevance. Progress through the training is tailored to individual 
performance in order to provide an optimal level of challenge while minimizing frustration. 
Hence, individuals who are performing well on a particular training component are advanced 
to the next difficulty level, while others are provided with additional exercise opportunities 
to master a skill before advancing. Below are the training components.
• Psychoeducation and motivation enhancement: The first 1–2 sessions focus on 
providing a rationale for and engaging the trainee in the ensuing training. The 
trainee is asked to provide examples of difficulties s/he has experienced in social 
situations, and treatment-related and social functioning goals are collaboratively 
set. A rationale for and overview of training content is presented, along with 
video-clip examples of social situations with negative outcomes, and brief 
discussion of consequences of making and acting on hasty social judgments.
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• Module 1: Separating social facts from guesses. Content for this module was 
adapted from Social Cognition Interaction Training (Penn, Roberts, Combs, & 
Sterne, 2007; Penn et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2014). The goals of this module 
are to (1) reinforce the idea that many of the assumptions we make about social 
situations are only guesses, and (2) practice the skill of making more accurate 
guesses by carefully evaluating information used to support them. As the 
exercises begin, the focus is on distinguishing judgments of fact (e.g. the direct 
perception that a pictured individual is smiling) versus judgments that are 
guesses (e.g. the inference that a smiling person is experiencing an internal state 
of happiness). Trainees are shown pictures and asked whether specific statements 
are factual (e.g. “Is it a fact that the man in the picture has a hat on his head?” or 
“Is it a fact that the man is thinking about an upcoming meeting?”) and asked to 
justify why the statements are or are not factual (e.g. “I can see the hat”, “I 
cannot see what he’s thinking”). The focus of the training then shifts to 
examining different types of guesses, and whether other facts of the situation 
make them good or bad guesses. Toward the end of the module, trainees are 
asked to comprehensively evaluate social scenarios by first generating facts about 
them and then making good (i.e. supported by facts) guesses about them.
• Module 2: Making probability/confidence judgments and not jumping to 
conclusions about social situations. Some of the content for this module was 
based on closure/disambiguation tasks used by Moritz and colleagues to assess 
and treat a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (Moritz & Woodward, 2007). 
The goal of this module is to develop skills in evaluating the quality of social 
guesses based on the type, quality and facts that do or do not support them. As 
the exercises begin, trainees practice identifying facts that either do or do not 
support specific guesses about a social scenario and then assign confidence 
judgments to different guesses (e.g. when evaluating a photograph of a woman 
and a policeman standing on a corner and looking at a map, it’s a good guess that 
the woman may be asking for directions). As the module progresses, trainees are 
asked to evaluate the likely accuracy of guesses made about partially obscured 
photos, and then to re-rate the likelihood of these guesses as more information is 
revealed. Finally, trainees are simply shown social scenarios and asked to make 
their own high-likelihood guesses.
• Module 3: Determining others’ mental states and intentions. Exercises in this 
module were based on the work of Sarfati and colleagues (Kayser, Sarfati, 
Besche, & Hardy-Bayle, 2006; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Besche, & Widlocher, 
1997; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Brunet, & Widlocher, 1999; Sarfati et al., 2000), 
who showed that verbal elaboration of information presented about social 
situations increases the accuracy of guesses made about those situations. The 
goal of this module is to develop skills in using verbal elaboration of facts to 
more accurately predict future events and to make good guesses about others’ 
thoughts, feelings and intentions. Trainees are shown a sequence of events, and 
then asked to guess what is most likely to happen next (e.g. shown a photo series 
of woman in sleeveless shirt holding her arms together, close to her torso, it’s 
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more likely that she’ll next put on a sweater than that she’ll take a drink of cold 
water). Throughout the training, emphasis is on evaluating the scenario and guess 
options by “talking through” each component in order to more fully process and 
integrate relevant information. As the training progresses, stimuli sets become 
longer and more complex, and trainees are asked to generate their own guesses 
about the thoughts, feelings and intentions of characters presented in the social 
scenarios. In the final level of this module, trainees are presented with social 
sequences with a negative outcome, and are asked to describe what happens in 
these scenarios, whether they think the negative outcomes were accidental or 
intentional, and to justify their guesses.
• Module 4: Inducing a positive interpretive bias in ambiguous social situations. 
Exercises in this module were based on the work of Constans, Mathews, Yiend 
and colleagues (Constans, Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999; A. Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews & Barch, 2006; Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 
2005), who demonstrated that a positive interpretive bias can be induced by 
presenting what are initially ambiguous social situations and then presenting 
additional information that disambiguates these scenarios in a positive direction. 
The goal of the module was for trainees to develop an automatic bias toward 
interpreting ambiguous social events in a positive manner. Similarly to Constans 
and colleagues, we presented brief stories wherein the trainees had to complete a 
word fragment that disambiguated the story to a positive interpretation (e.g. you 
exit a building behind somebody and they let the door swing shut in your face. 
They probably didn’t {see you}). This was followed by a comprehension 
question that further reinforced the positive interpretive bias (e.g. Were they 
trying to be rude to you?).
Data analysis
Measures of dispersion and distribution were calculated and inspected to assess normality 
and identify potential outliers. Descriptive statistics were calculated for participant 
demographic variables. To assess treatment feasibility, summary values were calculated for 
number of potential participants who called to inquire about the study, were found eligible 
based on brief telephone screen, were found eligible following in-person intake screening 
assessment, completed each of the assessments, and completed all treatment sessions. 
Individuals who dropped out of treatment (those who completed T1 testing but either did not 
participate in the training intervention or did not participate in the post-training assessment) 
were compared to those who remained in the treatment on demographic, neurocognitive, and 
social cognitive variables. T-test was used to examine potential differences on training task 
motivation and participant satisfaction ratings between those who completed all training 
sessions versus those who did not complete all sessions. Tolerability of the intervention was 
assessed by averaging participant satisfaction ratings of each of the rated components.
Correlations between the two primary measures of attributional style and the two primary 
measures of theory of mind were computed to establish if they measure sufficiently similar 
constructs that they could be combined into a single attributional style and a single theory of 
mind composite score. Pearson correlation was computed between pre-training MCCB 
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composite score and USS Skills Test to examine the relationship between baseline cognitive 
function and pre-training performance on skills taught during the USS intervention. These 
correlations were repeated for the primary and exploratory social cognitive measures. 
Preliminary efficacy was evaluated using three separate indices: paired samples t-tests 
comparing second-baseline with post-training assessments (T2 and T3), Cohen’s effect size 
for within-subjects designs (Dav), and Reliable Change Index (RCI; Jacobson & Truax, 
1991), with inputted test-retest values based on T1 and T2 test-retest reliability. Due to the 
preliminary, exploratory nature of these analyses, p-values were not corrected for multiple 
comparisons. For the USS Skills Test, since double-baseline data was not obtained and we 
could not calculate test-retest reliability, the number of improvers was calculated using the 
Standard Deviation Index (Duff, 2012). In order to examine whether baseline cognition 
impacted degree of improvement during USS training, we computed correlations between 
T2 MCCB total score and T2-T3 change on USS Skills Test, primary and exploratory social 
cognitive measures. Finally, we tallied the number of individuals who, based on RCI or 
Standard Deviation Index, improved on at least one of the outcome measures.
Results
Of 81 individuals who called about the study and were screened by phone, 58 were found 
eligible and consented. From among these, six screened out during a more comprehensive 
in-person assessment. Fifty-one and forty-nine participants, respectively, completed T1 and 
T2 assessments. Forty-five individuals attended at least one training session, with thirty-nine 
of them completing all training and the post-training assessment. One individual repeatedly 
fell asleep during testing and every training session and his testing performance was 
questionable (e.g. >4 standard deviation impairment relative to current sample on Hinting 
Task) hence was excluded from analyses, bringing the final sample size of individuals with 
post-training data to 38. Demographic information for these individuals is presented in Table 
1.
There were no significant differences on demographic, neurocognitive, or social cognitive 
characteristics between individuals who completed the study (n=38) versus those who 
completed social cognitive measures at T1 but did not complete the full study (n=13). 
Comparing those who began USS training sessions but did not complete (n=6) versus those 
who completed all sessions, there were no significant differences on participant satisfaction 
ratings nor motivation for the training. For individuals who completed the study, average 
satisfaction ratings are presented in Table 2. Some of the write-in participant comments 
were: “I liked that it made me think things through”, “The training opens your eyes to 
judgments” and “I didn’t like realizing most of the facts were actually guesses”.
There was a significant relationship between baseline cognitive function (MCCB composite) 
and pre-training performance on the USS Skills Test (r = .459, p = .007). MCCB also 
significantly correlated with pre-training performance on two of the four primary measures 
(Hinting r=.42, p<.05; Eyes r=.46, p < .005; IPSAQ PB r=.13, p = .45; AIHQ Ambiguous r’s 
−.12 to .10, n.s.) and on the majority of exploratory measures (with the exception of 
DACOBS). As the correlations between the two primary theory of mind measures and the 
two primary attributional style measures were low (r’s −.05 to .34), performance on all four 
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tasks was evaluated separately. Table 3 presents performance on the primary and exploratory 
measures at T1 and T2, along with test-retest reliability. Table 4 presents pre-post USS 
training performance, along with paired t-tests, effect sizes for within-subject designs, and 
information on the number of individuals who improved based on Reliable Change Index 
cut-off scores.
There was significant, large effect size improvement on the USS Skills Test, with significant 
moderate ES improvements on one of the primary attributional style measures (AIHQ). 
Neither of the two primary theory of mind measures improved significantly, though baseline 
performance on one of them (Hinting Task) was near ceiling. On exploratory measures, there 
was significant though small effect size improvement on the Comic Strip, the Picture Story 
task, and the DACOBS. There was no significant relationship between baseline cognitive 
performance, as assessed by MCCB, and amount of change on the USS Skills Test or any of 
the social cognitive measures. Similarly, none of the specific MCCB neurocognitive domains 
correlated significantly with amount of change on the USS Skills Test. Nine of thirty-eight 
participants (24%) improved on at least one of the four primary outcomes. None improved 
on all four primary outcomes. Twenty-eight of thirty-eight participants (74%) improved on 
at least one of the primary and secondary outcomes combined, though none improved on all 
16 outcomes.
Discussion
Our findings indicate that the USS training is well tolerated by individuals with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders, with little drop-out from beginning to end of training and 
high treatment satisfaction ratings. Our participants thought the training was useful, and 
helped them evaluate the complexities that go into making social judgments. There were 
large improvements on the USS Skills Test, suggesting we were effective in teaching 
specific training content. Moreover, the training was associated with medium-sized 
improvements on one of the primary measures of attributional style, along with significant, 
albeit small, treatment signals on three of the exploratory measures. Notably, two of those 
measures (Comic Strip Task and Picture Story Task) tested content and skills very similar to 
that emphasized by the USS training. Importantly, while pre-training neurocognition was 
associated with pre-training performance on a majority of our social cognitive measures, 
along with the USS Skills Test, baseline cognitive function did not impact the amount of 
learning, indicating that the training was not less effective for individuals with greater 
cognitive impairments.
Contrary to initial expectation, we did not find an effect on either of the two primary 
measures of theory of mind. Lack of effects on the Hinting Task may have been due to the 
already relatively high initial performance, with little room for improvement, while for the 
Eyes Task lack of improvement may have been due to the high vocabulary demands of the 
task, which were not targeted during USS. An alternative explanation (and one that can also 
be applied to several of the exploratory measures), is that some of our measures were simply 
too different from the content of the training. While USS narrowly targets foundational 
theory of mind skills like fully processing social situations and using concrete evidence to 
make and evaluate different social judgments, some of our exploratory assessments targeted 
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very different skills, like drawing inferences from indirect verbal cues and subtle facial 
expressions. The limited overlap between our training and some of these measures highlights 
the heterogeneity of social cognition and the importance of choosing the right outcome 
measures—not only ones that purportedly assess the same molar social cognitive construct 
as that being trained, but that actually capture the specific facets of the domain that are being 
trained. While we need to be mindful of not just “training to the test”, we at the same time 
need to consider to what extent a measure assesses the specific types of skills taught during 
the intervention. This problem is also highlighted by the fact that neither our primary 
measures of theory of mind nor of attributional style were significantly correlated with one 
another.
Another methodological consideration for treatment trial design is the quality of the 
measures used. Our double-baseline design allowed us to assess the test-retest reliability of 
multiple social cognitive measures. Unfortunately, only a few reached the commonly 
accepted threshold of r ≥.70. Any conclusions we could draw about the preliminary efficacy 
of USS are severely limited by this. The problem of inadequate or limited psychometric 
information about social cognitive measures has been recognized by the scientific 
community (Green et al., 2008), and efforts are under way to remedy this hurdle to ongoing 
development and validation of social cognitive interventions (Pinkham et al., 2014; 
Pinkham, Penn, Green, & Harvey, 2015).
As this was an open, uncontrolled, proof-of concept trial, typical limitations of such trials 
should be kept in mind (e.g. potential practice effects, cohort or historical effects, impact of 
adjunctive treatments, random noise). Moreover, we are not able determine whether the 
promising effects of USS are due to the specific treatment delivery methods, the training 
content itself, or a combination of the two.
In summary, the USS intervention was well-tolerated, and the large and significant 
improvement in knowledge of training content, along with the lack of impact of baseline 
cognition on improvement in content knowledge, suggest that USS shows promise as a 
treatment for higher-level skills in individuals with lower cognitive function. Of course 
while our preliminary efficacy data is encouraging, key to subsequent trials will be the 
development of psychometrically sound, sensitive measures that adequately capture targeted 
skills. Further development of this treatment, keeping in mind the end-goal of improving 
social function, will quite likely require more intense training incorporating bridging work, 
including homework assignments and practice of skills in everyday settings. Finally, while 
the current USS intervention narrowly targets specific components of theory of mind and 
attributional style, further modules could be developed to target additional facets of these 
domains, including, though not limited to, detection of lies, sarcasm, faux-pas, and second 
and third order theory of mind skills.
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Table 1
Demographics for study participants (n = 38)
Measure M (SD)
Age 51.74(8.66)
Education 12.42(1.94)
WRAT t-score 41.26(9.88)
Age at onset 20.68(10.68)
Number of hospitalizations 6.40(4.94)
Gender (%male) 61%
Marital status (% never married) 66%
Diagnosis
    Schizophrenia 74%
    Schizoaffective disorder 13%
    Other disorder with psychotic features 13%
Race
    African American 53%
    Caucasian 45%
    Hispanic 3%
MCCB total score 29.50(12.34)
PANSS total score 47.34(8.18)
Quality of Life total score 72.76(12.58)
GAF score 40.78(9.35)
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Table 2
USS training participant treatment satisfaction ratings
Questions Mean (SD)
Training materials were easy to understand 3.38 (.46)
I found this training helpful 3.52(.43)
I found this training useful 3.47(.45)
This training will help me to better understand social situations 3.57(.42)
This training will help me to better understand other people 3.51(.43)
Note. 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree
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Table 3
Test-retest reliability of social cognitive measures at T1 and T2 (n = 38)
T1
Mean (SD)
T2
Mean (SD)
Test-retest
reliability
(T1, T2)
PRIMARY
USS Skills Test -- 16.25(1.66) --
IPSAQ Personalizing Bias .57(.30) 60(.27) .66
AIHQ Ambiguous Items
    Hostility 1.87(.50) 1.72(.44) .46
    Blame 2.96(1.05) 2.98(.96) .52
    Aggression 1.57(.40) 1.51(.32) .41
Hinting Task 17.76(2.35) 18.16(1.91) .62
Eyes Task 19.79(4.91) 21(5.60) .71
EXPLORATORY
TASIT Tot 46.08(6.66) 42.55(6.59) .70
    TASIT Lies 25(3.47) 25.66(4.31) .60
    TASIT Sarcasm 21.08(5.50) 16.89(5.56) .50
BLERT Total 13.34(3.84) 13.76(3.93) .74
    Confidence in correct Answers 2.49(.33) 2.5(.46) .55
    Confidence in incorrect Answers 1.78(.37) 1.77(.53) .49
Comic Strip Total 19.47(4.83) 21.16(5.04) .78
Brune Picture Story 42.61(9.30) 47.66(10.09) .48
DACOBS Total* 168.92(38.41) 161.5(36.73) .87
Note.
*On DACOBS, lower scores indicate better social cognition.
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